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UNITED STATES MISSION  
TO THE  
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION  
(USNATO)

**STATEMENT BY  
WILLIAM J. PERRY  
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TO  
THE RESTRICTED SESSION  
SPRING 1994 MEETING OF THE  
DEFENSE PLANNING COMMITTEE  
ON SUMMIT FOLLOW-UP**

- The NATO Summit in January 1994 was a watershed event for the Atlantic Alliance. Our leaders took a number of dramatic steps that will transform our Alliance. It is appropriate at this point, four months after that historic event, to take stock. I would like to comment briefly on the three major initiatives launched at the Summit: Partnership for Peace, Combined Joint Task Forces, and the NATO non-proliferation initiative.

**Partnership for Peace**

- Let me first turn to the Partnership for Peace. This initiative will lay the foundation for a new European security system with NATO at the center.
- We can be pleased with the progress achieved in a few months. But we must press forward to ensure sustained progress toward deepening NATO relationships with its new partners.

**Exercises**

- One area for continued attention is exercises. We applaud the Netherlands for being the first to offer to host a PFP field exercise, and we are delighted with SACLAN's proposal for a PFP maritime exercise. The US will support and participate in both of these activities.
- In addition, the US believes that it is important to hold PFP field exercises in partner countries. The Polish offer to host such an exercise is just what we need to complete the 1994 program. NATO should act quickly to accept this offer and to expedite the necessary planning. I can assure you that this undertaking will have the full support of the United States.
- At the same time, we need to start thinking about the PFP exercise program for 1995 and beyond. NATO and its partners should strive to finalize by the end of this year a more ambitious schedule of exercises for 1995. I would suggest at least two field exercises be held in peace partner states.

**Defense Planning**

- We should also begin developing a defense planning and review process, as called for in the PFP framework document. Defense planning should be a core PFP activity. It can provide the basis for meeting the long-term PFP objective of developing forces that are better able to operate with those of NATO.

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- This defense planning and review process should:
  - Parallel, to the degree possible, time-tested NATO defense planning procedures;
  - Accommodate the particular needs and capabilities of partners and allies who do not currently participate in NATO defense planning; and
  - Focus specifically on the requirements for the missions and operations envisioned within the PFP program, and
  - Promote transparency and reciprocity to the maximum extent feasible.
- We realize that the full development and implementation of this process will take time. But we should seek early agreement on procedures and commit ourselves to the goal of conducting an initial, simplified review of interested partner defense plans before the Fall 1994 Ministerials.

#### Defense-to-Defense Relations

- We also need to build more robust cooperation between Defense Ministries under PFP. This interaction would be a useful complement to our military-to-military cooperation.
- I propose that our Permanent Representatives examine how NATO can support an increased cooperative role for Defense ministries. Options should include regular meetings of NATO Defense Ministers with their counterparts from PFP nations perhaps on an annual basis.

### **PFP Funding**

- We also need to examine how to ensure adequate funding for PFP.
- We could hold to the general principle that each partner nation should fund its own participation in PFP activities. But it is already clear that some partners who want to participate actively will not be able to do so without some assistance. It would be a tragedy if PFP could not realize its full potential for lack of adequate support.
- We should better coordinate our bilateral security assistance to partners with a view to facilitating their participation in PFP, and the Alliance should consider how it might redirect some portion of its common budgets to support PFP.

- The second Summit initiative is the Combined Joint Task Force concept.
- The United States remains committed to the strengthening of a European Security and Defense Identity through the development of CJTF headquarters.
- To this end, I support the efforts in the provisional Policy Coordination Group to develop the political guidance for CJTF formation and development, including the refinement of structures and procedures for dealing with political guidance, planning and preparation for Alliance crisis management missions.

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- Regarding these structures and procedures, we must take advantage of the capabilities of the integrated military structure and remain committed to a single Alliance – not one for Article 5 and another for non-Article 5 purposes. Any structural adjustments must be accompanied by full involvement of all 16 nations in all appropriate crisis management bodies.
- We should also take steps to ensure a close relationship between CJTF and PFP and to incorporate our PFP partners in CJTF headquarters implementation through training, exercises and other activities.
- The pace of progress on the CJTF initiative rests more on European than American shoulders. Europeans have much more to gain from developing a mechanism that will allow the use of NATO assets for Europe-only contingencies.

#### **Non-proliferation**

- The January Summit also tackled what has become one of the principal threats to Alliance security in the post-Cold War era: the continuing proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery vehicles.
- The Alliance must ensure that it has the means to protect against military threats posed by proliferation of weapons of mass destruction should our primary efforts at prevention fail. Consequently, I am quite pleased with progress made by the two bodies chartered at the Summit to address the proliferation challenge.

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- The overall policy framework developed by the Senior Politico-Military Group will help to illuminate the nature of the proliferation problem and will reflect the critical role of NATO.
- The responsibility for determining what capabilities are needed to counter the proliferation threat will fall squarely on the Senior Defense Group on Proliferation, or DGP. The responsibility for ensuring that NATO acts on these recommendations and actually deploys the needed capabilities will fall squarely on us, the NATO Ministers of Defense.
- The work plan developed by the DGP charts an ambitious course. I am confident that the DGP brings together the right people at the right time, with the right mission, to yield a plan of action that will measurably improve the future security of the Alliance and its members.

## CONCLUSION

- In summary, we are engaged in a major effort to adapt NATO to a new era and to meet the challenges of the future. We laid the foundation for this endeavor at the January Summit and have accomplished much since then. But this is a long undertaking that will require our sustained attention.
- We have before us an historic opportunity to build a new Trans-Atlantic security system that will ensure peace and stability in all of Europe well into the next century. If we can maintain our efforts to transform the Atlantic Alliance, I am confident we will succeed.